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Abstract. After the Arab uprisings, the EU designed a new regional programme for the 
development of the agricultural sector of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
partners. The European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(ENPARD) is based on an integrated logic for rural development. This new conceptual 
framework advocates multi-sectoral planning and the active participation of local actors in 
the decision-making process in order to promote inclusive growth and to support small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). This approach aims to contribute to the security and stability of 
the rural areas of the Arab Mediterranean partners (AMPs). This paper analyses ENPARD 
and it argues that the inclusion of new actors in the design of the programme has partially 
challenged established views of policymakers within the EU. However, EU engagement in 
this area is still determined by a hierarchical mode that puts local actors at the bottom of the 
decision-making process and it is driven by a technocratic ratchet mechanism that fits new 
information into existing cognitive frames. Despite some positive changes in national policies 
the paper claims that this type of technocratic engineering does not change social relations in 
rural areas and it undermines the success of the programme. 
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Introduction 
After the Arab revolts, the EU announced a new ENP aiming to make the policy more 
objective and effective. The new ENP was followed by a new rhetoric, which underlined the 
need for more jobs and inclusive growth (European Commission, 2011a, 2012a). For the 
development of the agricultural sector of the ENP partners the EU tried to improve the 
effectiveness of the policy by designing ENPARD. ENPARD was launched in 2012 and it 
works parallel to the Association Agreements (AAs), as it supports the modernisation of the 
agricultural sector of the AMPs and as part of the ENP seeks to prepare these countries for a 
greater stake in the EU market. Yet, ENPARD does not focus on trade issues or border 
controls. It is a regional programme that attempts to increase the economic and political 
stability of rural areas by improving the organisational capacity of the ENP countries, the 
livelihoods of vulnerable groups and by supporting small farmers. Through ENPARD the EU 
claims that it adopts an integrated approach for the rural development of the AMPs. This 
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approach has already been established in the member states since the mid-1980s, and it has 
helped small farmers in the EU and candidate countries to improve their livelihoods. 
This contribution analyses the work of ENPARD in the AMPs. The paper argues that 
while the EU’s perception of the threats to the stability of the rural areas remain the same after 
the uprisings, with the introduction of ENPARD in 2012 the logic of integrated rural 
development shapes a new path for framing the development of AMPs’ countryside.  
However, the operationalisation of the new framework through ENPARD so far has 
brought mixed results. On one hand the new frame played a positive role for improving the 
national strategies for rural development. Yet at the same time the selective collaboration of 
the EC with epistemic communities based mainly in Europe encourages an inward-looking 
attitude for providing solutions to AMPs. This approach undermines the EU efforts to support 
small producers. The programme expands the export basis of the partner countries, but the 
changes that it brings do not discourage clientelist practices and they do not mitigate 
significantly the centralisation of power in local rural societies.  
As the literature about the agricultural component of Euro-Mediterranean relations 
focuses predominately on trade-related issues (Emlinger et al, 2008; Gillespie, 1997) and not 
on the EU rural development initiatives in the AMPs, this article employs a qualitative 
methodology that focuses on the analysis of the official documents produced by the EU and 
the Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Mediterraneennes - Institut Agronomique 
Méditerranéen de Montpellier (CIHEAM-IAMM), which coordinates ENPARD. These 
documents are triangulated with ENP progress reports, in order to compare and evaluate the 
EU’s work in this area before and after 2010.  
For explaining the sources of the EU response to the uprisings, the article starts by 
tracing the ENP work before 2010 and the origins of integrated rural development. After the 
identification of the new framework, the paper analyses the interpretation of threats for the 
countryside of AMPs before and after 2010 and the role of the new (and old) actors involved 
in ENPARD. This analysis is followed by a section explaining the effects of ENPARD on 
improving the stability and security in the rural areas of AMPs. This contribution finishes by 
mapping the impact of the programme on AMPs. 
 
From trade liberalisation to integrated rural development: the ENP before and after the 
Arab uprisings 
The creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership made the AAs the main pillar of the 
agricultural part of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The primary aim of the agricultural 
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component was the liberalisation of food trade between the EU and AMPs. The AAs mainly 
focused on the gradual elimination of border controls and tariffs of a certain number of food 
products. As a result, they left issues of deeper integration (e.g., non-tariff barriers) for the 
future or included them in a very general manner. 
After a few years of implementation, it became obvious that the AAs did not meet the 
expectations of policymakers. The protectionist approach of some EU states is often cited as 
the main problem in the negotiations between the EC and AMPs (Gillespie, 1997; Joffé, 1998; 
Montanari, 2007; Tovias, 1997). However this is not the only factor hindering agricultural 
trade liberalisation. Another important problem is the existence of non-tariff barriers within 
AMPs (such as low food standards and regulations incompatible with the EU rules) (Emlinger 
et al., 2008). Addressing these problems was the main priority on the agenda of the Ministers 
of Agriculture of the EU and the Mediterranean partners in the First Euromed Conference in 
Venice in 2003. There it was agreed that further negotiations for the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade should be complemented by the reduction of non-tariff barriers. 
The initiation of the ENP in 2004 as a policy that would integrate deeper AMPs into the 
EU market added a second pillar to the agricultural part of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
The Action Plans (APs) signed between the EU and AMPs complemented the AAs and aimed 
to confront all the non-tariff aspects of agricultural trade discussed in Venice. In exchange for 
a larger stake of the EU market the APs required similar actions by AMPs. These were related 
to administrative support to farmers, the improvement of sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
controls (SPS) and measures encouraging private investment in agriculture. These 
interventions aim to improve food safety requirements and facilitate trade in agricultural 
products with the EU (European Commission, 2004, 2004). 
The progress that AMPs have made in the implementation of the ENP has been uneven, 
as they did not embrace the strategy with the same enthusiasm. Until the uprisings Tunisia 
and Morocco implemented more actions of the agricultural part of the strategy, followed by 
Egypt and Jordan. Yet, despite the uneven pace of reforms, AMPs pursued policies that 
increased agricultural production and trade with the EU. The EU progress reports mention 
that until 2010 the AMPs reduced (selectively) non-tariff barriers in food products, they 
introduced SPS and their regulatory bodies received training for adjusting their legislation 
and standards to the EU rules (European Commission, 2009, 2010, 2011b). Furthermore, 
investments in agriculture were encouraged through the privatisation of state companies 
(such as SODEA and SOGETA in Morocco), large-scale privatisations of farming lands and 
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reduction of controls for foreign investors (in Morocco and Tunisia) and land reclamation 
schemes (in Egypt). 
The implementation of the APs improved the export capacity of AMPs, which saw their 
exports to European markets increase symmetrically with the pace of the ENP-led reforms. 
As the best performer of the ENP in the region until 2010, Tunisian food exports to the EU 
were increasing about 10 per cent each year (Directorate General for Trade, 2016c). During 
this period Moroccan and Egyptian food exports also experienced high growth (the main hick-
up in this trend occurred in 2009, due to the global crisis) (Directorate General for Trade, 
2016a, 2016b). 
Yet, the greater stake of the EU market that the partners were getting benefited only a 
small segment of the Arab Mediterranean rural population. Even if many analysts argued that 
the profits from the openness of Arab Mediterranean trade to the EU (and global markets) 
were captured primarily by local business and political elites (Bush, 2004, 2007, p. 200; 
Desrues, 2005), the initial response of EU member states after the Arab uprisings was of 
scepticism about any potential changes of the existing EU programmes. This is evident in the 
Annex of the conclusions of the first European Council meeting after the death of Mohammed 
Bouazizi in December 2010. On 4 February 2011, member states agreed that the EU 
relationship  with the Southern partners of the ENP should be based on the ‘principles set out 
in the Association Agreement and the commitments made’ (European Council, 2011a, p. 14). 
It was the EC that a few months after the revolts linked ‘the unrest in several Southern 
Mediterranean countries [...] to economic weaknesses’ (European Commission, 2011a, p. 7). 
In its first strategy paper about the reaction of the EU to the Arab uprisings it stressed the 
need for a more precise focus of the APs on fewer actions with more specific benchmarks 
(European Commission, 2011a, p. 18). Three days after the release of the strategy paper, EU 
member states gave the green light to the EC to review the existing programmes in order to 
focus on the present needs of the ENP partners (European Council, 2011b, p. 5). 
The focus on the present needs of the ENP partners and the suggestions for fewer actions 
were accompanied by more emphasis on inclusive growth, job creation and the role that SMEs 
could play in the inclusive economic development of Arab Mediterranean societies (European 
Commission, 2011a). For the agricultural aspect of the ENP, the EC was determined to draw 
lessons from previous EU experience and from programmes which helped the accession of 
the new member states (NMS) (Clarke, 2012; European Commission, 2011a). In support of this 
approach the European Parliament (EP) stressed that poverty is ‘a persistent evil in the 
countryside’ (Rinaldi, 2012) and assistance to SMEs is crucial in dismantling existing 
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oligarchies. The EP called the EU to contribute to the development of a healthy agricultural 
production and rural development in the region ‘in order to strengthen the stabilisation 
process’ (Rinaldi, 2012). Several voices in other EU institutions highlighted the need ‘to foster 
an agricultural sector geared to small farmers’ (Narro & Moreno, 2014, p. 18) 
Towards this direction the EU initiated ENPARD in 2012 and the programme became 
the main vehicle that demonstrated the EU's commitment to inclusive growth and stability in 
its neighbourhood. According to the former Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development Dacian Cioloş, with ENPARD: 
 
the European Commission sends a very clear signal of our willingness to put agriculture 
at the heart of our relationship with our neighbours and friends […] ENPARD 
programmes are not merely about funding, but also about working methods, which have been 
shown to be effective, in particular during the accession of the new EU Member States. (European 
Commission, 2012b, emphasis added)  
 
The new working methods that ENPARD attempts to introduce originate from the idea of 
integrated rural development. This appeared in the EU in the mid-1980s as a result of the 
transformation of the welfare state model and of the diverse rural experiences across Europe. 
Besides the privatisation of state companies, a key aspect of this transformation was a change 
of focus from government to governance (Jones, 2000; OECD, 2006; Ward & McNicholas, 
1998). 
This change indicated two things. First, the era of large-scale state investments in 
infrastructure was coming to an end and subnational agro-commercial regions and centres 
were forced to design sustainable social and economic policies and development plans (Ray, 
2000). Second, the diverse rural experiences in Europe signalled that rural development could 
not be perceived any more as an automatic result of an increase in agricultural production, 
but as a multidimensional process with economic, social and environmental parameters (such 
as improvements in distribution of income, equitable access to resources, sustainable use of 
resources and production). The word ‘integrated’ emphasised that previous sectoral policies 
that were organised by central authorities were often disjointed and failed to address these 
parameters in a holistic manner. The new approach saw these issues as parts of a master plan 
that should be coordinated at the local level. 
For the successful coordination of the various sectoral actions that meet diverse needs 
and circumstances (such as improvements in infrastructure, credit schemes, training of 
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farmers, irrigation programmes and initiation of environmental standards) the concept 
advocated the mobilisation of local actors that were encouraged to form partnerships with the 
state, the private and the third sectors. The active participation of local farmers is an essential 
component, as they can provide solutions that are contextualised according to their needs. 
The argument of the EC was that this new integrated framework has a strong element of 
endogenous development, as it incorporates local knowledge and it allows the creation of 
networks which provide better and more innovative solutions that address the particular 
challenges of rural areas. 
In practice the first integrated rural development programme appeared in the EU in 
1982 (Ward, 2002), but the new model was established with the introduction by the EC of the 
Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie Rurale (LEADER) in 1991. Initially as a 
three-year programme, which has been prolonged until today (as LEADER II and LEADER+) 
LEADER exemplified the integrated rural development approach of the EU. The initiative 
focused on areas of less than 100,000 people and supported small-scale projects (European 
Network for Rural Development, 2014). The participation of local farmers was ensured 
through the operation of Local Action Groups (LAGs), which formed partnerships between 
the public, voluntary and business sectors and carried out the suggested business plans. 
During the first period of LEADER (1991-1994), more than 600 LAGs were approved for 
funding across the EU. This number grew significantly during LEADER II (1995-2000) and 
LEADER+ (2000-2006) covering more than 890 LAGs in the old member states (Ray, 2000). 
After 2007, LEADER was extended to the NMS and to candidate countries as part of the pre-
accession rural development programmes. 
By mentioning the previous EU experience, Commissioner Cioloş was highlighting the 
bottom-up approach of LEADER and the space that it provides for partnerships at the sub-
regional level between the public, private and civil sectors. This new working method could 
give the opportunity to small farmers and local actors of AMPs to influence decisions in states 
dominated by centralised decision-making processes and to improve the local rural 
economies (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, n.d.-a). 
As ENPARD follows LEADER’s conceptual framework for stimulating the agricultural 
activities of small farmers in AMPs, it also shares its principles. The principles of ENPARD 
are long-term policy planning, integrated approach to rural development and the 
participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in both the decision-making and 
implementation of the programme (CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.). 
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If one looks at the amount of funds that the EU committed to ENPARD, it would be 
tempting to dismiss it as of no great significance for the development of the Arab 
Mediterranean countryside. For the start-up phase of the programme and for fostering 
political dialogue between different actors the EU has allocated €2.8m from 2012-2014 and 
€4m from 2015-2020 (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). The first four countries 
that have implemented ENPARD are Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco and the funds that 
the EU has committed to the two countries subject to regime change are indicative. From the 
beginning of ENPARD and until today the EU has offered to Tunisia €25m and to Egypt €36m. 
Important is also the fact that these two countries have selected more areas than the two other 
AMPs. The pilot areas in Tunisia are Ain Draham, Bargou, Kerkennah, Kébili Nord, Médenine 
and Jendouba and in Egypt are Matrouh, Minia and Fayoum. The Jordan authorities have 
selected Ajloun and Tafilah and Morocco has decided to follow a non-territorial approach. For 
Morocco the ENPARD funds are added to technical assistance of €70m for supporting the 
Green Morocco Plan (Plan Maroc Vert), which covers the entire country (CIHEAM-IAMM, 
n.d., n.d.). 
Algeria and Lebanon have joined one year later (in 2013) and they receive fewer funds 
from ENPARD. Algeria gets €10m for employment in rural areas of Ain-Témouchent, 
Laghouat Setif and Tlemcen (“Programmes for Technical & Financial Support,” n.d.). Lebanon 
has finalised its working plan at the end of 2013 and it has agreed to extend the programme 
for one year. Within this period the focus of ENPARD was on building the capacity of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. In 2014 €6.8m were allocated for supporting local SMEs and 
cooperative schemes (Women Economic Empowerment Portal, 2014). After an EC invitation 
in July 2015, the Palestinian authorities decided to join the programme and a kick off seminar 
was organised in 2016. At the moment of writing only the priority themes have been identified 
for the implementation of ENPARD and only preliminary meetings have been held between 
stakeholders (CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.). In all ENP countries the operational programmes of 
ENPARD are funded by the ENI, SPRING, cooperation tools (such as TAIEX and 
TWINNING) and co-financed by the ENP countries (CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.). 
However, the emphasis that the EU puts on the enactment of the new frame for the rural 
development of the AMP goes beyond the current funding cycle. ENPARD has become an 
essential component of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements that the EU 
negotiates with all the ENP partners, as it attempts to address the various threats in the rural 
areas of neighbouring countries. The new working method entails a change in the EU’s 
conceptual framework, as it indicates that the EU was willing to give more room to small 
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farmers and local authorities over the design and implementation of rural development 
projects. However, this conceptual framework does not suggest a different understanding of 
the main threats for the rural areas of the AMPs, but a way to address them. This is discussed 
in the next sections. 
 
EU threat perception before the Arab uprisings: the ENP as a top-down and ineffective 
policy 
The importance of agriculture in the economy of AMPs has for many years been 
acknowledged by the EU. Yet, the economic crises that hit these countries after 2010 increased 
regional disparities, inequality and poverty rates and they highlighted the multidimensional 
character of stability and security in rural areas. 
Stability and security in rural areas have an economic, a political and an environmental 
dimension. These dimensions are interlinked and cover food security, rural poverty and 
unemployment, decentralisation of the decision-making process for rural development, 
cooperation between rural areas, social inclusion of vulnerable groups (such as women and 
youth) and sustainable production. 
The ENP country reports have helped the EU to identify the nature of these threats and 
their impact in each ENP partner. Rural poverty and unemployment hit especially youth and 
women in AMPs. For example, at the beginning of the policy 63 per cent of the Moroccan 
children were out of secondary school in rural areas contrary to 24 per cent in the urban areas. 
In the pilot areas of ENPARD school enrolment in secondary education does not exceed 50 
per cent of female students whereas in the urban areas of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco the 
number is higher than 70 per cent (“Education Policy Data Center,” 2012; UNICEF, 2013a, 
2013b).  
Food security has not been seen simply as the failure of agriculture to produce sufficient 
food at the national level, but as the failure of the state to guarantee access to sufficient food 
at the household level. Availability, access and affordability are elements of food security and 
the EU has recognised since the beginning of the ENP the complex interlinkages between the 
individual, community, national and international levels (European Commission, 2004a, 
2004b, 2005). Similarly, the decentralisation of the decision-making process and social 
inclusion are concepts that have come of age and all the mainstream donors include actions 
for helping vulnerable people to gain access to a range of activities regarded as typical for 
their societies. 
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The definition of these threats in the country reports informed the construction of the 
APs, which included actions for increasing the stability and security in rural areas. Yet, despite 
their tailored design, the APs suffered from several weaknesses. They envisaged actions 
without specific benchmarks and the EU’s approach was top-down and deterministic. 
This method undermined the efforts of the EU. The absence of specific benchmarks in 
the APs meant that the partner countries did not need to provide any milestones for their 
annual reforms or national plans that indicate how they specifically address problems in rural 
areas. As a result threats such as food (in)security, rural poverty and unemployment were 
dealt indirectly with emphasis being put on the benefits of economic growth and food price 
stability for increasing the purchasing power of the poor in rural areas and for creating more 
jobs. At the same time the top-down approach of the EU allowed on the one hand the central 
authorities of partner countries to remain the main conduits of assistance for rural 
development, and on the other hand the state elites to reproduce their power in rural areas at 
the expense of vulnerable groups. Indicative of this approach are the conclusions of the report 
of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) about the cooperation of the EU with Egypt before 
2011 (European Court of Auditors, 2013a). ECA noticed that the EU interventions had given 
little attention to women and funds channelled through CSOs ‘were not sufficient to make a 
discernible difference’ (European Court of Auditors, 2013b). From 2007 until 2010 zero funds 
were given from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (the main 
EU aid tool for the ENP countries) for rural development, local community development, to 
agricultural SMEs and to serious environmental threats in rural areas (such as waste 
management). In the same vein, ECA was critical of the EU’s tolerance to the corrupted 
practices of the Egyptian mechanism. ECA mentioned that: 
 
Lack of budgetary transparency, an ineffective audit function and endemic corruption were all 
examples of these undermining weaknesses. The Commission and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) did not react to the lack of progress by taking decisive action to 
ensure accountability for considerable EU funds, which continued to be paid directly to 
the Egyptian Authorities. (European Court of Auditors, 2013b) 
 
The importance of regime stability as a way of maximising EU security is underlined in the 
introduction of this special issue. In the case of rural development the EU approach had a dual 
impact on the Arab Mediterranean countryside. First, it allowed the regimes of AMPs to 
reproduce their power by managing the allocation of the EU funds and the selection of priority 
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areas. Second, the deterministic assumption of EU policymakers that a higher stake of the EU 
market for the food products of partner countries would have a trickle-down effect and could 
improve living conditions in the Arab Mediterranean countryside led ENPI funds 
predominantly towards the parts of the APs that focused on the facilitation of trade, 
modernisation of agriculture and the SPS system. This situation proved inadequate to increase 
the stability of rural areas before the uprisings. 
 
EU threat perception after the Arab uprisings: new actors, different treatment? 
As part of the ENP, ENPARD also suggests that a greater stake of the EU market offers 
solutions to the perennial problems of Southern partners. In addition, the new programme 
does not offer a new understanding or definition of the aforementioned threats. However, the 
frame of integrated rural development that ENPARD puts forward introduces new actors in 
the decision-making process and a new method to address problems in rural areas. 
The EC attempt to draw lessons from LEADER for reducing the vagueness of the APs 
brought closer Directorate General (DG) Agri and DG DEVCO (especially Unit F responsible 
for the development of neighbourhood countries). The experience that the two DGs had in 
working with CSOs (through the LEADER programmes in the candidate countries for DG 
Agri and through the provision of assistance to developing countries for DG DEVCO) opened 
the decision-making process to civil society actors involved in the pre-accession programmes 
of the candidate countries and with experience in the rural development of AMPs. However, 
these CSOs had minimal input on the construction of the ENP APs, the priorities of which 
were negotiated by the EEAS and the state authorities of the AMPs. CIHEAM-IAMM in 
Montpellier, one of four institutes part of the International Centre for Advanced 
Mediterranean Agronomic Studies, with experience in the LEADER programmes of accession 
countries and with ties to rural institutes in AMPs, was contracted by the European 
Commission to develop the first programme of actions and to foster the political dialogue 
between the EU and the ENP Southern partners regarding their rural development (CIHEAM-
IAMM, 2012b). 
This situation created a new organisational pyramid with the EU institutions and 
European epistemic communities at the top, which manage to influence the direction of the 
new tool. The reports prepared by CIHEAM-IAMM reproduce the narratives of the previous 
country reports. For example, the new reports highlight the need for more food exports in 
order to ameliorate threats such as food security, rural poverty and unemployment. Yet, 
contrary to previous practices, the new reports suggest a different treatment recommendation 
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for increasing the standards of living of rural populations. They advocate the inclusion of local 
communities in the identification of priorities and solutions, which is consistent with the logic 
of integrated rural development (CIHEAM-IAMM, 2012a). 
Towards this direction, in its start-up phase (2012-2014) CIHEAM-IAMM with the help 
of DG Agri and DG DEVCO organised frequent meetings with different stakeholders in the 
EU and the AMPs for the development of rural areas. These organisations included trade and 
labour unions of AMPs, such as the unions of exporters, small farmers’ syndicates and NGOs 
active in rural areas, such as the Coptic Evangelical Organisation of Social Services in Egypt 
and the ‘Action and Solidarity Development’ in Tunisia (CIHEAM-IAMM, 2014). Equally, in 
countries where ENPARD entered its second phase (e.g., Morocco), CIHEAM-IAMM held 
meetings with public servants and CSOs that operate in rural areas. 
However, there is a critical difference between the rhetoric of participation and giving 
real power to rural communities to affect the outcome of the process. In the case of ENPARD 
consultation meetings and informing practices help the new (and old) powerholders to claim 
that all sides were considered, but critical elements of the threats in rural areas and the 
solutions that ENPARD implements are already decided by epistemic communities and 
technocrats, who are mainly based in the EU. This arrangement enables these actors to 
maintain their position on the top of this hierarchical structure. 
A key example of this tendency is the ENPARD’s rhetoric that frames ‘small farmers’ 
skills’ as problems for the sustainable development of rural areas. Similarly to the 
deterministic view of the EU before the Arab revolts, this rhetoric creates a particular 
business-oriented discourse for dealing with threats in rural areas that diminishes the capacity 
of local actors to provide solutions and influence the decision-making process. 
In ENPARD it is mentioned that the poor managerial skills of small farmers increase 
solid and agricultural waste and lead to overuse of chemical inputs and environmental 
degradation (European Commission, 2013a). Therefore, small farmers are unable to provide 
environmentally sustainable solutions (European Commission, 2013). As a result ENPARD 
offers the opportunity to think tanks in ENP countries to collaborate with CIHEAM-IAMM 
for driving ‘a process of analysis, capitalization and counseling that meets the policy-makers’ 
needs and expectations’ (“The ENPARD South support programme phase II,” n.d.). 
This narrative puts CIHEAM-IAMM in the driving seat and despite the rhetoric of the 
new integrated approach, ENPARD continues the work of policies introduced before 2010. 
For example, the solution suggested for making food production more sustainable is the 
adoption of Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) (CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.; EU Neighbourhood 
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Info Centre, 2015b, 2016). GAPs are not an abstract concept subject to negotiations between 
small farmers and other stakeholders. It is a set of codes, standards and regulations developed 
in recent years by the food industry and producers organisations. ENPARD supports the 
establishment of certification programmes (such as EurepGAP), which are developed by 
major European retailers. 
In addition, ENPARD encourages advisors to tie agricultural research and training 
workshops of small farmers to the ideas of competition, risk and productivity (CIHEAM-
IAMM, n.d.). Before 2010, the TWINNING programmes were doing the same work in AMPs. 
In Egypt, TWINNING offered technical assistance to the national centre ‘in order to better 
observe market needs and expectations, analyse market dynamics along with consumer 
habits, and provide public authorities with risk-assessment reports and innovative ideas for 
policy development’ (İşleyen, 2015, p. 682). According to İşleyen TWINNING programmes 
treat ‘local’ as a problem for the development of rural areas and the allocated funds lead to 
patterns of neoliberal governmentality (İşleyen, 2015). 
ENPARD interventions continue the implementation of the SPS controls of the past for 
dealing with threats in rural areas, but contrary to the previous approach, they introduce more 
specific benchmarks and they focus on the local level. This new approach gives the capacity 
to the EU to be more efficient. GAPs codify agricultural practices at farm level for a range of 
commodities. Their purpose varies from fulfilment of trade and government regulatory 
requirements (in particular with regard to food safety and quality), to more specific 
requirements of specialty or niche markets. In the more advanced countries that implement 
the programme (such as Morocco) specific regions have become pilot areas (Fes Boulemane, 
Meknes-Tafilalet, Oriental and Souss-Mass-Draa) for training agricultural advisors and 
specific benchmarks have been introduced. For example, in Morocco one advisor is allocated 
for every 1350 farmers and a minimum number of women is introduced among rural advisors 
(CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.). Similarly in other countries the local rural cooperatives that will 
apply the GAPs have been already selected. 
This new hierarchical mode has put new actors at the top of the decision-making 
process. These actors have determined both the definition of threats for rural areas after 2010 
and the remedies that must be applied in partner countries. This process has been driven by 
a technocratic ratchet mechanism that fits new information into existing cognitive frames. 
Instead of allowing farmers to effectively voice their views, powerholders conduct 
programmes, which aim to educate or ‘cure’ the participants in partner countries. This 
situation has significant material impact on small farmers, and despite the fact that ENPARD 
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attempts to bypass central authorities for the development of rural areas, it does not seriously 
challenge the status quo in partner countries. This impact of the programme is discussed in 
the following section. 
 
The paradox of top-down direction for bottom-up implementation and its effects 
ENPARD’s project-based approach has started to shape the national strategies of ENP 
countries and has helped them to integrate activities that were not envisaged in the APs. As 
mentioned earlier, before ENPARD the EU mainly supported top-down policies, which 
encouraged structural changes within agriculture (European Commission, 2004, 2004, 2006). 
These approaches were typically sectoral meaning that they supported schemes decided at 
the national level for the increase of the agricultural output without taking into consideration 
winners and losers of structural reforms in agriculture. In other cases, the EU financed stand-
alone projects, which were not an integral part of national or regional strategies (such as 
irrigation projects with questionable results for small farmers). On the other hand, the bottom-
up approach of ENPARD entails that its activities are contained in local strategies, which then 
inform the national strategy for the rural development of partner countries. The new frame of 
integrated rural development concerns actions that involve different environmental, 
economic and social sectors. 
In three of the four countries that have joined the programme, environmental risks have 
been addressed more concretely and positive changes have been traced in national plans. In 
Egypt, the introduction of the Joint EU Rural Development Programme through ENPARD has 
resulted in policy measures at the national level regarding the more efficient management of 
water and waste in rural areas. In Tunisia and Morocco where ENPARD has entered its second 
phase, the programme has helped to highlight the training of small farmers and the 
sustainability of resources as the main axes of the national strategies for the development of 
rural areas (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 2015a). In Jordan, there is not much evidence of 
change yet in the national strategy of the country. According to CIHEAM-IAMM, ENPARD 
is still in a phase of training local actors how to take more ownership of sectoral strategy 
documents and shape policymaking (CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.). 
Regarding economic threats, the focus of ENPARD on SMEs has brought back to the 
agenda the issue of rural poverty, neglected in the ENP APs and by partner countries 
(Pellissier & Gargano, 2015). One of the two main axes of the programme focuses on the 
diversification of the economic activity in rural areas and the creation of agricultural 
cooperatives and advisory services to small farmers for mitigating rural poverty. Compared 
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to the APs, this approach is a big leap forward, as the APs have only helped large farmers of 
AMPs to get a bigger stake of the EU market (Kourtelis, 2015; Narro & Moreno, 2014). To the 
more advanced AMPs, such as Morocco and Tunisia, the programme has already contributed 
to the establishment of advisory services in the pilot areas, the registration of agriculture 
cooperatives and awareness campaigns for the benefit of small farmers’ cooperation. 
Yet the other axis of the programme, which focuses on agricultural productivity, market 
efficiency and standards contradicts the efforts of the EU to strengthen local agricultural 
cooperatives. In an effort to link the Mediterranean to international markets and to keep its 
promise for offering a greater stake to the EU market for Arab farmers, ENPARD offers 
funding only to projects that increase the production of commercial crops destined to 
international markets. The problem here is that in some cases the identification of these crops 
(e.g., figs and olives in Tunisia) has been made at very early stages of the programme and 
before the creation of LAGs (CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.). This situation raises doubts about the 
inclusion of small farmers in the consultation process and illustrates the significance of 
epistemic communities in decision-making. In addition, the second axis of ENPARD promotes 
EU food safety and quality standards. Their rigorous implementation does not only question 
the participatory ethos of ENPARD, but has also economic implications. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and many analysts 
warn that despite the benefit of offering access to international markets, the rigorous 
implementation of GAPs and quality standards has often increased production costs and the 
risk of small producers not seizing market opportunities (Amekawa, 2009; FAO, 2008; 
Graffham, Karehu & MacGregor, 2007). These costs relate to technical training for innovative 
production and hygiene practices, variable inputs such as safer yet more costly pesticides, 
structures such as grading sheds, disposal pits and pesticide storage units, as well as 
periodical certification and accreditation (Amekawa, 2009). 
In the case of ENPARD the minimal funding that cannot cover these high investments 
and the uncertain picture after the end of the programme are not the only problems for small 
farmers. It is a structural challenge that emerges for small producers from the implementation 
of the EU initiative. By being forced to produce specific crops and follow standards decided 
in the EU, the formulation of small LAGs does not help much small farmers to elude market 
mechanisms, for instance by agreeing beforehand on procedures, the fixing of bids for tender 
and the allocation of local resources, and in this way to create a sort of local-scale corporatism 
that can lead to more inclusive growth. In addition, and even if ENPARD broadens the export 
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basis of AMPs, a large number of small and subsistence farmers that do not produce 
commercial crops are excluded from such projects and from participating in LAGs. 
Another area of concern for ENPARD’s contribution to the stabilisation of the Arab 
Mediterranean rural areas is that the programme follows the more-for-more doctrine of the 
EU towards the region. This conditional approach threatens the regional dimension of 
ENPARD and it indicates that the EU’s selective engagement does not determine only the role 
of the related actors, but also the operation of the tool across countries. AMPs that have 
entered ENPARD at a later stage (Algeria, Lebanon and Palestine) have received less funding 
than other states and their slower progress regarding capacity building makes it more difficult 
to compete for additional funds from ENPARD. As a result ENPARD increases divergence 
between participant countries. 
The territorial basis of ENPARD has helped policymakers to identify regions that are 
indeed in much need of EU funds. For example 83 per cent of rural poor in Egypt live in Upper 
Egypt (Ghanem, 2014) and the three areas that receive the ENPARD funds (Matrouh, Minia 
and Fayoum) are among the poorest in the country. Similarly in the other countries the rural 
people in pilot areas suffer from chronic poverty and unemployment. Yet, evidence so far 
show that the selected pilot areas are disconnected and the only regional element of the 
programme involves the sharing of best practices through conferences and workshops. Until 
today there are not any signs of cross-border-cooperation activities between the LAGs, which 
could stimulate the local markets, increase returns for small farmers and reduce rural poverty. 
As ENPARD is in its initial stages, lessons from the LEADER programmes illustrate the 
effects of this conditional (more-for-more) approach when combined with limited funding on 
the power that different actors enjoy in the decision-making process. In the initial phase of 
LEADER the EU’s contribution accounted for only 1.7 per cent of the total money allocated to 
rural development (Ray, 2000). Many analyses on LEADER in Italy and the NMS have 
underlined that competition between LAGs for the few funds of the programme worked as a 
barrier to their cooperation at the regional level. In fact, research shows that the combination 
of this competitive approach and of minimal funding brings LAGs closer to the national 
authorities of their countries, as it strengthens the reliance on individual relations with central 
authorities to secure money for their projects (Kovách, 2000; Osti, 2000). 
This situation does not have only economic consequences for local areas, but also 
undermines ENPARD’s work towards reducing the pervasiveness of centralised procedures 
over rural development. By functioning as such, the EU does not manage to substitute the 
existing hierarchical model between central authorities, local actors and CSOs, criticised by 
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EU institutions and in ECA reports, with a network of actors that manages market relations 
in favour of smaller producers. The inclusion of research institutes and the presence of local 
cooperatives may increase the legitimacy of the programme, but at the same time reinforces 
the omnipotence of central authorities. Evidence from candidate countries and NMS shows 
that under such conditions the governments are in a position to select with whom they will 
work at the local level (Kovách, 2000; Petak, 2011). 
Exclusion of CSOs in AMPs from development projects is not a new phenomenon, even 
if the space that the governments allow to local NGOs differs both spatially and temporally. 
The difference between this situation and ENPARD is that the EU initiative promotes subtle 
forms of containment for CSOs, which are not clearly visible, but still undermine rural 
democratisation. Besides the capacity of the state to facilitate the work of CSOs with close ties 
to the government (Hamdy, 2011), there is a threat that ENPARD can turn LAGs into an 
instrument promoting the preferences of well-established policy communities at the local 
level, as it has happened in NMS and candidate countries. Their experience shows that these 
policy communities are comprised by farmers, CSOs and food processing industries, which 
have managed to retain their power by shaping the discourse about participatory rural 
development and the responses of the local and central authorities (Kovách, 2000; Shucksmith, 
2000). Research in AMPs illustrates that the capacity of small farmers to influence the design 
of rural development projects is minimal (Ghanem, 2014) and the participation of CSOs does 
not necessarily contributes to the building of autonomous rural organisations capable of 
representing the diverse interests of the rural poor and amplifying their voices in public policy 
processes. Without careful management ENPARD can repeat mistakes of other rural 
programmes in these countries, which at the end did not lead to partnerships between 
political and civil society. According to Bergh such programmes blurred the boundaries 
between political and civil society in rural areas and encouraged: 
 
elite capture and the expansion of clientelist practices, all of which stands in sharp contrast 
to the assumed positive outcomes of decentralization and participation policies and the 
prospect of accountable co-governance. (Bergh, 2010, p. 741). 
 
The last issue that deserves attention is the role that ENPARD can play in the livelihood of 
vulnerable groups, such as women and rural youth. The aim of ENPARD is to offer training 
to women and young people from ENP countries. The related documents mention the 
‘particular attention that is paid to the inclusion of young people […] and women […]. These 
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groups are explicitly targeted in several programme activities such as professional training’ 
(CIHEAM-IAMM, n.d.; European Commission, 2013), and in some cases (e.g., Morocco) 
women are trained as agricultural advisors. Further details about the organisation of these 
training workshops are not available yet, but again previous experience shows that in many 
cases women are underrepresented and their non-involvement is a result of low levels of 
schooling or persisting illiteracy (Hartl, 2009). According to UNICEF, the literacy level of 
Tunisian women (96.1 per cent) is higher than that of other participant countries (UNICEF, 
2013a, 2013b) and based on these facts, the Tunisian training programme has more chances 
for success. However, the design of the training sessions and access to credit are matters of 
paramount importance for the improvement of living conditions in rural areas. Projects 
funded by the UN with similar goals to ENPARD (such as the Oued Sbaihya project in 
Tunisia) generated processes of both inclusion and exclusion. Women that lived in households 
with small land and low income were found in a worse position and with greater debts after 
the application of the programmes (Gana, 2012) or they did not qualify for loans to pursue 
their own initiatives and their income remained low (Hartl, 2009; Khafagy, 2009). Often the 
skills that rural youth and women acquire from such technical workshops prepare them for 
off-farm working and lead to urbanisation rather than to a reduction of chronic poverty. 
 
Conclusion 
After the Arab uprisings the EU put the promotion of inclusive growth and support to small 
producers higher on its agenda. For the agricultural part of the ENP, the EU designed a new 
regional programme to support small farmers and address the security and stability threats 
in rural areas of AMPs. The inclusion of epistemic communities and CSOs has influenced the 
cognitive framework of ENPARD. These actors adopted an integrated strategy for the rural 
development of AMPs, which was developed in the EU since the beginning of the 1980s and 
implemented through the LEADER programmes since the 1990s. Based on lessons from 
LEADER, the new programme envisaged to mitigate the security risks that threaten stability 
in the countryside of the Southern rim of the ENP by adopting a multi-sectoral and 
participatory approach for development. Fundamental to the success of the programme is the 
opening of the decision-making process to local actors. 
During its first years of existence, ENPARD’s new framework for rural development 
has managed to bring some positive measures and shape the focus of national strategies 
regarding environmental degradation and rural poverty. However, the attention of the EU to 
improvements of reforms that existed before 2010 and its selective engagement with particular 
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actors limit the success of the programme. The insistence of the EU on the more-for-more 
approach and on the promotion of regulations that are designed in the EU expands the export 
basis of AMPs, but undermines regional cooperation and inclusive growth. At the same time, 
the EU engagement primarily with epistemic communities based in Europe and with national 
authorities of ENP countries shapes unevenly the discourse about rural development. 
Paraphrasing Haas these epistemic communities generate consensual knowledge (Haas, 
1992), but as it is the case in other EU policy areas, experts’ opinions primarily reinforce 
institutional choices and consolidate bureaucratic power (Verdun, 1999). Within ENPARD 
this approach allows new patterns of exclusion to emerge from the attempted decentralisation 
of the decision-making process. As a consequence stakeholders’ involvement is 
asymmetrically realised in practice. This situation indicates that after the revolts, the 
implementation of the new EU frame of integrated rural development only partially addresses 
the politico-economic threats in rural areas of Southern partner countries. 
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